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the merits. 3 The present decision follows the holding in the
recent Louisiana case of State ex rel. Girtman v. Ricketson.4
Although the wife's modified Tennessee custody decree was
obtained in the absence of the husband and the children, the
order may well have been considered in Tennessee as a further
proceeding in the original action, so that the court would be
deemed to have continuous jurisdiction.5 Under such circum6
stances there would be no point in citing May v. Anderson,
where the court which awarded the custody to one parent had
no personal jurisdiction whatsoever over the other parent.
If, in either of the two cases here discussed, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had felt that it would be in the best interests
of the administration of justice to recognize the foreign custody
decree, their action might have been surprising but it would
not be subject to any constitutional review for accepting voluntarily a foreign judgment which they were not compelled to
recognize under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
MINERAL RIGHTS
Harriet S. Daggett*
In Smith v. Holt1 it was most logically decided that when
the same lessee, owner, under definition given in the Conservation Act, was operating a drilling unit established by the commissioner, an order for pooling was unnecessary. Thus, drilling
on one part of the unit was user as to all, though two different
servitudes were involved, and the land covered by one had not
been used.
In Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Succession of Miller,2 the evidence
disclosed no intention on the part of the landowners to sign a
joint contract of lease with the servitude owners. Indeed, it
was found that the landowners did not know that the servitude
owners were to be parties to the lease. Thus, there was no
3. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
4. 221 La. 691, 60 So.2d 88 (1952). See The Work o the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952

Te'rm-Conflict
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REVIEW 230, 234 (1953); Note, 27 TULANE L. REV. 361 (1953).
5. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913).
6. 345 U.S. 528 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 683 (1954).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 223 La. 821, 67 So.2d 93 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 438 (1954).
2. 224 La. 216, 69 So.2d 21 (1953).
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extension of the life of the servitude, under a well-settled line
of cases.
Elson v. Mathewes3 has been discussed in an article entitled
"Brief Comment and 'Speculation re Elson v. Mathewes" which
appeared in this Journal in April, 1954, beginning at page 547
of Volume XIV. Thus, further comment by this writer would
be superfluous.
In Arkansas Fuel Co. v. Sanders,4 the question was posed
whether landowner or servitude owner would benefit by the
lapse by prescription of a royalty right while a servitude on
the land was still extant. The decision that the servitude owners
were entitled to the proceeds from production, which were in
dispute, seems eminently correct. The court's observation that
there was nothing to "revert" after prescription had run against
the royalty seems perhaps to be an over-simplification of the
situation. Certainly the debtor gains and the creditor loses in
every case of a like nature so that something of value passes
whether the word "revert" is accurate or not. When the burden
or debt of the land to the servitude owner is wiped away by
prescription the word "revert" has been acceptable. 'In the instant case, the servitude owner having assumed the debt to the
royalty owner obviously gained when the royalty right prescribed.
Bourg v. Hebert5 involved the following facts. Over a
period of about six years twenty separate servitudes were created
by reservations of all minerals in various parcels of land sold
to the plaintiffs. With one negligible exception the tracts of
land were contiguous. Before any interruptions by drilling had
occurred and before any of the servitudes had prescribed, the
twenty servitude owners and the owner of the lands which they
burdened entered into a wordy agreement which purported to
renew the expiring mineral interests in their then owners and
transfer one-half of these mineral interests to the landowner.
Thereafter, there was development on certain of the tracts. Suit
was brought by the landowner ten years after the date of the
agreement to declare the tracts upon which there had been no
3. 224 La.
4. 224 La.
5. 224 La.
were reported

417, 69
448, 69
535, 70
by the

So.2d 734 (1953).
So.2d 745 (1953).
So.2d 116 (1953). This case and the following cases
writer in 3 OIL AND GAS REPORTER (1954), sponsored by

the Southwest Legal Foundation of Dallas, Texas, published by Matthew
Bender and Company. Permission has been granted by Matthew Bender
and Company to use portions of that material here.
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development free of mineral servitudes because of their prescription. Defendants pleaded that the agreement purported to resolve all of the twenty servitudes into one covering the entire
contiguous area. Thus, development anywhere on the land
involved would have interrupted prescription on the whole tract.
The court held that no new single servitude was created by the
contract and that prescription for non-user had run on the undeveloped tracts. It was also held that agency for leasing did
not pass to transferee.
The contract presented to the court for interpretation was
not questioned for validity. Though the wording of the contract
and the principles of servitude do not justify it, in preceding years
the idea of absolute indivisibility of servitude might have been
argued since the parties to the contract halved the minerals then
extant in the twenty mineral servitudes. The recent case of
Elson v. Mathewes in a logical and practical decision made it
clear that landowner and servitude owner may modify their
existing contract with the view of dividing the servitude first
created. It was noted in the instant case that the district judge
had spoken of the parties' purpose being to revise their position
created by the original sales of land with reservation of minerals.
The several steps taken by the parties in the formulation
of their agreement present interesting questions. The landowner waived or renounced his "accrued prescription." The Louisiana Revised Civil Code of 1870 provides that a prescription
may not be renounced until it has accrued. After full accrual
the servitude would expire and no longer burden the land. In
this type of servitude, discontinuous non-apparent, a re-creation
would have to be by title which one Justice has indicated would
not necessarily have to be by ordinary deed.
In the instant case the full prescriptive period had not run
on any of the twenty servitudes. The amount of accrual against
each servitude varied. When all accruals against the twenty
servitudes were renounced at the same time, apparently the
equivalent of an interruption by acknowledgment was effected
and each was given a new term of ten years. 7 Otherwise, their
lengths of term would have maintained the same variation as
had hitherto been the case, which does not appear to have been
6. 224 La. 417, 69 So.2d 734 (1954).

7. See Art. 3460, LA. CwvL CODE OF 1870; Segond v. Landry, 1 Rob. 335
(La. 1842); Carraby v. Navarre, 3 La. 262 (1832).
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the contemplation of the contenders. Consideration was obtained
for this interruption by the landowners' acknowledgment which
in the writer's judgment makes the application of the acknowledgment principle, really a re-creation of the servitude, a
stronger and more logical concept, since no moral consideration exists, as it does in ordinary use of the acknowledgment
principle.
If the consideration given by the servitude owners was coownership in the twenty separate servitudes, the question of
indivisibility might be argued despite the recent decision that
landowner and servitude owner may revise, re-create and thus
divide because a landowner may not own a servitude upon his
own land. Thus, the consideration must have been one-half of
the divisible benefits of the servitude, since a servitude owner
may not create a servitude and even if that were possible could
not create one to be owned by the landowner upon whose land
it was to bear as it would immediately be extinguished by confusion. Hence, under the analysis of the contract given by the
court, it was unnecessary to rely upon the theory of revision
of contract whereby the landowner purported to create twenty
new servitudes carrying but half the benefits of the originals.
This process would have involved almost as great departure
from the principles of servitude and the words of the contract as
the defendants urged when pleading that a new single servitude
had been created presumably by the servitude owners as consideration for the landowners' renunciation of accrued prescription.
The idea of conveyance of benefits of the retained servitude
is further borne out by the court's decision regarding the leasing
powers set forth in the contract. The servitude owners retained
the.full leasing power over all of the land. When their interest
was conveyed to a third party the court found the leasing provision to have created a mere agency in the servitude owners.
The word royalty was used and the court might have taken the
view that the consideration given to the landowner was only
a Vincent-Bullock8 type royalty in which case the full leasing
power would have passed to the purchaser of the servitudes.9
Settled rules of servitude were followed as were guides
to contract interpretation. Renunciation of accrued prescription
8. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
9. See DAGGETT, MINE:RAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 264 et seq. (rev. ed. 1949).
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as applied in the contract is not usual but does not violate legal
provisions. The contract, formulated seventeen years ago, a
relatively long time in the fast-moving jurisprudential history
of mineral rights, was drawn with singular astuteness and would
apparently have avoided the many pitfalls of its day preceding
the more advanced decisions of the interlude.
In Berman v. Brown' sublessors transferred their holding
with the following stipulation:
"The one-sixteenth (1/16) part of the eight-eights (8/8)
of all the oil, gas and other minerals excepted and reserved
by assignors herein shall apply and be a part of all future
renewals, extensions and new leases made by assignee on
the lands covered by the herein described lease or leases
for a period of one year from the date of the expiration of
said lease or leases."
It was also provided that this stipulation would extend to
"heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns" of the
parties to the sublease. After judgment for cancellation of the
original lease in a suit brought by the landowner-lessor a second
lease on the same property was obtained within the year by
a sublessee of one who had obtained from the first sublessor.
Suit was brought by the original sublessors against the holder
of the new lease for the royalty reserved by the stipulation set
forth above. It was held on rehearing that the obligation bound
personally only the original sublessee and his assigns who had
not broken the covenant but did not extend to a second sublessee as there is no contractual relation between a lessor and
a subtenant.
On the first hearing the author of the majority opinion found
for the plaintiffs having recognized the purpose of the stipulation, the legality of which was unquestioned, to be to insure
"fair play." The judgment cancelling the first lease was examined and found to have been a release for the plaintiff-landowner only, not affecting the parties to the stipulation in question. The plea of res adjudicata was rejected as the facts did
not meet the well-settled rules. The three grounds of estoppel
were carefully examined and the defendant found not to have
One Justice felt that the estoppel plea should be sustained.
Two Justices dissented, one of whom, the Chief Justice, wrote
10. 224 La. 619, 621, 70 So.2d 433, 434 (1953).
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sustained the double burden of proving the facts and to have
been misled to his detriment.
an opinion wherein he differed in the analysis of the judgment
of cancellation and in rejection of the third ground of estoppel
which involved interpretation of instruments of release which
the majority had found to be mere quitclaims in favor of the
landowner and to which the defendant was not even a party.
While the ground of the majority decision on first hearing
cannot be said to rest expressly upon equitable fair play or good
public policy in the oil business, an impression comes through
to the reader that these considerations underlie the stated reasons. Certainly the Louisiana Code article on equity" and the
so-called Golden Rule article 1 2 and some of their previous applications would have supported the decision, if called upon.
13
The recent case of McCormick v. Phillips Petroleum Co.
upheld a stipulation somewhat similar to that of the instant case,
finding something of a fiduciary relationship between assignor
and assignee, and feeling that it would be an unfair contract
which would allow a deliberate termination of an overriding
royalty without chance for protection. 14 Certainly the manifest
intent of the stipulation in the instant case was to prevent
exactly what happened. The evidence clearly showed that the
defendant had intentionally failed to develop his lease inviting
cancellation so that he could terminate the heavy overrides by
securing another lease clear of them in all of which he was successful.
On rehearing, a Justice who had silently concurred in the
first decision wrote the majority opinion of reversal. The major
ground of the reversing decision seems to be one of distinction
between an assignment and sublease and obligations of each.
The Louisiana rule of distinction is that a transfer retaining an
overriding royalty is a sublease while one not retaining an overriding royalty or other form of control is an assignment. Parties
to the stipulation or their assigns were said to be bound personally but a sublessee could not be held. The future contingency, taking a new lease by one bound by the condition, was
said not to have happened, thus no one could be held and the
attempt to prevent a top lease being taken by one in the chain
11. Art. 21, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
12. Art. 1965, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
13. See 3 OI. AND GAS REPORTER 29 et seq. (1954).

14. See Discussion Notes of Case, 3 id. at 38-39.
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of title failed, though the intent was clear that all succeeding
owners would be bound. It is notable that the discussant of
the Phillips case cited above indicated the reverse idea in connection with duties of one who "retains no interest" in Louisiana an assignor as distinguished from a sublessor.
The Justice who wrote the majority opinion on the first
hearing naturally dissented from the majority opinion on the
second hearing. He stated that the differences of opinion probably grounded on the equities involved and he supported his
view with a list of authorities who believed that lessees should
be prevented from using "inequitable and unconscionable" actions to destroy overriding royalties. Moreover, the dissenting
Justice pointed out that under the settled jurisprudence of Louisiana an overriding royalty to continue under future leases is a
real obligation running with the land and that the recent case of
Wier v. Glassell' 5 had been overruled sub silentio by the instant
decision.
In Horn v. Skelly Oil Co. 6 certain minerals were held to
have been reserved by a vendor of land and thus a servitude
created which prescribed in ten years for non-user, returning
the reserved minerals to the plaintiff, transferee of the land.
Had a royalty been found to have been reserved by the basic
deed of transfer, reservations of minerals in subsequent transfers of the land would have been valid, placing ownership of
certain percentages of minerals in the defendants including a
lessee.
The interpretation by the majority of the court of the key
paragraphs of the basic instrument involved seems sound under
all of the general rules of guidance. The initial statement vests
one-half of the minerals in the vendor of the land, rendering
following verbiage subsidiary. The best evidence of the intention of the parties,. namely their own interpretation by subsequent acts, is present. The date of the deed in question was
previous by a year to the decision which gave royalty as such,
not dependent upon a lease, its definite place in Louisiana law. 17
Indeed, had this case already been decided, a draft of like nature, the purpose of which being clearly for security purposes
until deferred land payments had been made would certainly
have more closely tracked the language of the interpreted in15. 216 La. 828, 44 So.2d 882 (1950).
16. 224 La. 709, 70 So.2d 657 (1954).
17. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
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strument, had royalty rather than servitude been truly intended. Moreover, any bank and surely the Federal Land Bank
would not have given over entire control to the credit purchaser,
as does a reservor of royalty only, but would have established
for leasing purposes an agency only, as the court found that
they had done, which, coupled with the interest which the land
purchaser on credit certainly had, would better secure the
debt. Moreover, the court has stated that royalty is a lesser
right than servitude.' The public should be able to assume that,
in arranging security for a credit sale, the bank's attorney would
reserve the greater right in minerals or other possible assets.
Thus, if intention is the criteria 'of interpretation, it would
appear in the light of all the surrounding facts, that a reservation of minerals and not royalty was made.
A learned and interesting discussion of the disturbing words
"Provided however" appears in the opinion of the dissenting
Justice. Without the several elements previously mentioned,
these words might indeed have been thought to indicate a limitation upon the opening sentence of the reservation rather than
an establishment of agency.
In Hicks v. Clark 9 the reservation of a right of reversion
of minerals was held not to be valid as it could result in a circumvention of the law and public policy of the state that a
mineral servitude must be exercised or become extinguished in
ten years. The reversionary interest in minerals in Louisiana,
like an illegitimate child, has been copiously discussed but never
really recognized. The instant case in clear cut and unmistakable language declares this reversion to be an illegal object
of commerce because of the public policy against prolonging
the life of a servitude without exercise of the right to explore.
The handling of the question of reversion by the court has
been most interesting. Initially, it was indicated that the object
was a valuable one, which, since there was no law against it
and at that time no declared public policy against it, might be
bought and sold. In that case, however, it was found that there
had been no intention to deal with it. Later, the court found
consistently that an attempt to deal with minerals at a time
when they were vested elsewhere as servitudes was but an attempt to create title to a thing not owned and hence invalid.2 0
18. See Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So.2d 73 (1949).
19. 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954), 15 LOUISIANA LAw Ruvmw 229.
20. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 184 et seq. (rev. ed. 1949).
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The corollary to this situation was an attempt to buy a thing
21
already owned, again invalid.
The instant case deals squarely not with minerals, not
owned or already owned, but with the reversionary right to
these minerals, an expectancy, a hope, a presently existing
thing, which presumably could be dealt with if not illegal or
against public policy. The court strongly and logically asserted
the public policy and hence a reversion could not under this
decision be an object of commerce.
Does this decision finally dispose of and put to rest the
troublesome question in all of its aspects?
It might be argued that the doctrine of after-acquired title
has not been squarely put at issue in a situation where the vendor
of minerals not owned became the owner thereof by virtue of
his ownership of the land at the time of loss of an outstanding
servitude by prescription.2 2 It might be argued that the doctrine of oversale, a different approach to but possibly a strained
blend of the concept of the doctrine of after-acquired title has
23
been recognized.
The strong words of the opinion under discussion to which
there was no dissent make it seem likely at present that
another approach, whatever the labelled doctrine, would be
said to be "an effort to circumvent the public policy" and make
it possible for mineral rights to be "outstanding for more than
'24
10 years without exercise of the right to explore.
The court's attitude toward a so-called top lease, which
might be termed a reversion of the right to search under a different legal pattern, that of a contract to lease instead of a sale
contract, creating a servitude, is of particular interest in contrasting analogy to the announced public policy regarding "reversions" of mineral rights. Space allocated for these notes does
not permit extended discussion of the allied topic at this time.
Delta Refining Co. v. A. J. Bankhead25 arose from a concursus proceeding brought to determine ownership of several
mineral interests. A certain document was pleaded as an acknowledgment interrupting prescription of the mineral servi21. Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43 So.2d 782 (1949).

22. See Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger, 222 La. 670, 63 So.2d 420 (1952).
23. See Bates v. Monzingo, 221 La. 479, 59 So.2d 693 (1952).
24. 72 So.2d 322, 325 (La. 1954).
25. 225 La. 422, 73 So.2d 302 (1954).
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tude but found to be a mere statement of interests without
intent to interrupt prescription. A second written agreement
was found not to affect the mineral interests as the servitude
had lapsed and could only be re-created by title, which the
document could not be interpreted to pass as no consideration
was found nor was such a purpose indicated. A third agreement
was found to be a valid compromise. The minors involved were
granted their royalty interests as prescription had been suspended as to them. Well-settled rules are applied in this decision: that a bare acknowledgment or recitation of present interest without a clearly expressed intent to interrupt prescription of a mineral servitude will not have that effect; that an
expired servitude cannot be dealt with-a new one must be
created and that by title; that minority will suspend the running of prescription unless the law provides otherwise, which
at the critical date at issue, it did not;26 that a compromise to
avoid litigation has the force of a judgment.2 7 The interpretation of the several documents involved seems satisfactory to
the reader and follows the guides of the Code and of the jurisprudence.
Eota Realty Co. v. Carter Oil Co. 28 was a suit for cancellation of an assigned portion of acreage of original lease for
failure to develop over a period of ten years and for attorney's
fees. The defense was that lease was indivisible and lessee had
not been put in default. The court held that under terms of lease
contract itself, lands under lease might be surrendered in part
and that certain acreage around the producing well was to be
held in case of cancellation of lease on remainder; that proper
demand had been made and refused, hence putting in default
would be a vain thing. The statute granting attorney's fees upon
cancellation had been complied with and hence a reasonable fee
was allowed.
The court stated that this issue was to be ruled by its facts
and the specific terms of the lease contract. Cases cited in support of the indivisibility of a lease, notably LeBlanc v. Danciger 9
and Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 30 were said not to be applicable.
That ten years, the term of an unused servitude, had elapsed
26. But see La. Acts 1950, No. 510, p. 935.

27 Art. 3078, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
28. 74 So.2d 30 (La. 1954).

29. LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855
(1950).
30. 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947).
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without development on the area for which cancellation was
asked may have been an influential factor though it was not
stated to have been. The fact that by the terms of the contract
the lessee might discard unwonted acreage and reduce land
rentals while keeping what it wanted without development is
well stressed. Again, that upon cancellation in whole or in part
for any reason, a producing well and 160 acres of land might be
held is a convincing answer to the lessee's plea of indivisibility
of lease. The facts of the former cases holding for indivisibility
of lease, under theory of indivisibility of obligation to drill a
well are easily distinguished in fact but not so readily in doctrine. Be that as it may, this decision is most heartening, particularly to those who have had difficulty in assimilating the
mysteries of indivisibility of lease in some previous cases-when
met with others dealing with assignment of part of the acreage.
Active breach by refusal to comply with demand, requiring
no putting in default, is well illustrated by the instant case.
Revised Statutes 30:102 having been complied with by lessor,
award of reasonable attorney's fees obviously followed.

Torts and Workmen's Compensation
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS

Negligence
Standard of care. Courts generally agree that it is the duty
of the physician, surgeon or dentist to exercise the degree of
skill ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by the
members of his profession in good standing in the same locality,
and to use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best
judgment, in the application of his skill to the case. Two ideas
are implicit in this definition of the professional standard of
conduct: First, the standard of skill is that of a complex and
erudite profession. It is conceded that the medical layman, including even the judge, is incapable of passing an intelligent
judgment on such matters and that there must be resort to
medically expert opinion which will likely be determinative in
each controversy. Second, the element of care and diligence
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

